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I.THE LESSON OF RICARIMANISM
It is now almost a century since John Stuart Mill's greatwork on
the Principles of Political Economy appeared. In this treatiseMill
rounded out and summed up the classical system of which Ricardo
had been the leading architect. Mill wrote with dignity, assurance,
and authority. His mind was not beset by doubts concerning the
true principles of political economy. "The mostimportant propo-
sition in political economy," he proclaimed, "is the law of pro-
duction from the land, that in any given state of agricultural skill
and knowledge, by increasing the labour, the produce is not in-
creased in an equal degree." In Mill's world, diminishing returns
defined the production function in agriculture and thus set the
stage within which economic progress couldunfold. Population
and technology were the dynamic factors in economic life, but
population was considered the more potent variable. As popula-
tion increased, the land already being farmed would need to be
cultivated more intensively or inferior land brought under the
plow; costs on the margin of cultivation consequently would rise,
and serve ultimately to enrich the landlords and injure the capital-
ists and workers. "It is vain to say," Mill lamented, "that all
mouths which the increase of mankind calls into existence, bring
with them hands. The new mouths require as much food as the
old ones, and the hands do not produce as much."
If these doctrines of the classical school make curious reading
today, it is well to note that our perspective has been altered by the
emergence of new problems and a century of experiencewith the
old ones. From the vantage point of history, we know that the
Ricardians vastly overestimated the dynamic pressure of popula-
tion and underestimated the power of technology. We know that
the static tendency of land to yield a diminishing return to succes-
sive increments of labor has been swamped by the historical ten-
dency towards improvement in the industrial arts. Between 1870
and 1940 we have tolerably reliable measurements, and they show
Reprinted from Twenty-sixth Annual Report of the National Bureau of Economic
Research (June 1946,pp.3-29.Asubsequent and more detailed critical examination
of Keynesian economics appears in Part Two of the present volume, in the essay
"Keynesian Economics Once Again." See also the essays below on "The Instability of
Consumer Spending" and "Hicks and the Real Cycle."
1J. S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy, ed. Ashley, pp. 177, 191.
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that the output of American agriculture increased much faster
than employment, decade after decade. At the end of the seventy-
year period employment was only 34 per cent higher than at the
beginning, while output was 279 per cent higher.2 Today many are
troubled by the mechanization of agriculture and the slow growth
of population, few are concerned over the 'law of diminishing re-
turns.' In their study of American agriculture, published by the
National Bureau in 1942, Barger and Landsberg do not even men-
tion the law.
I have taken this excursion into history because we are living
in a time of bold and vigorous theoretical speculation, the only
close parallel of which is the Ricardian age. The principal prac-
tical problem of Ricardo's generation was whether the state should
foster the economic power of the landlords or of the rising manu-
facturing class. The heated discussions of this question stimulated
Ricardo to take the distribution of incomes as the principal prob-
lem of economic theory, and he thereby set the pattern of classical
economics. The principal practical problem of our own generation
is the maintenance of employment, and it has now become—as it
long should have been—the principal problem of economic theory.
This transformation of economic theory is due in large part to the
writings of John Maynard Keynes, which are exercising a great in-
fluence on the thinking of economists and the shaping of public
policies in our own and other countries. But although Keynes and
his followers are concerned with a range of problems that the classi-
cal economists shunned, by and large they still seek to arrive at
economic truth in the manner of Ricardo and his followers. Broad-
ly speaking, the Keynesians investigate the volume of employment
and income of a country on much the same plane as the Ricardians
investigated the distribution of incomes. If the fate of the Ricar-
dian system carries a moral, it has not been clearly impressed on
this original and able group of economists of our generation.
II.KEYNES' THEORY OF UNDEREMPLOYMENT EQUILIBRIUM
I have said enough to set the theme of my report, which is to re-
late the work of the National Bureau to the Keynesian thinking
of our times. The opinion is widespread that Keynes has explained
what determines the volume of employment at any given time,
and that our knowledge of the causes of variations in employment
2HaroldBarger and Hans H. Landsberg, American Agriculture, 1899-1939,p.253.
Ofcourse, these figures exaggerate the disparity, since they take no account of the
shift from direct labor on farms to indirect labor in factories.
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is now sufficient to enable government tomaintain a stable and
high level of national income and employmentwithin the frame-
work of our traditional economic organization.If this opinion is
valid, the solution of the basic problem ofdemocratic societies is
in sight, and the National Bureau would dowell to reconsider its
research program. Unhappily, this opinion reflects apleasant but
dangerous illusion.
The basis for the Keynesians' confidence isKeynes' theory of
underemployment equilibrium, which attempts to showthat a
free enterprise economy, unless stimulated bygovernmental poli-
cies, may sink into a condition of permanent massunemployment.
The crux of this theory is that the volume of investmentand the
'propensity to consume' determine between them a uniquelevel
of income and employment. The theory can be putsimply without
misrepresenting its essence. Assume that business firms in the ag-
gregate decide to add during a givenperiod $2 billion worth of
goods to their stockpiles, using this convenient term toinclude
new plant and equipment as well asinventories. This then is the
planned investment. Assume, next, that business firms do notplan
to retain any part of their income;3 so thatif they pay out, say, $18
billion to the public, they expect to recover $i6 billionthrough
the sale of consumer goods, the difference beingpaid out on ac-
count of the expected addition to their stockpiles.Assume, finally,
that the 'consumption function' has a certain definite shape;that
if income payments are, say, $18 billion, the public willspend $17
billion on consumer goods and save $i billion, and thatone-half
of every additional billion dollars of income will bedevoted to
consumption and one-half to savings. Under these conditions,the
national income per 'period' should settle at a level of $20billion.
The reason is as follows. If income payments were $18billion,
the public would spend $17 billion on consumer goods. Butthe
firms that made these payments expected to sell $16 billionworth
to the public and to add $2 billion worth totheir stockpiles; the
actual expenditure of $17 billion on consumer goods would there-
fore exceed sellers' expectations by $ibillion, and stimulate
expansion in the consumer goods trades. On the other hand,if
income payments were $22 billion, the public wouldspend $ig
billion on consumer goods; this would fall short of sellers' expecta-
8Thisassumption is not essential to the Keynesian system; I make it here in order
to simplify the exposition. The figures used throughout are merelyillustrative.
Further, the exposition is restricted to the proximate determinants of employment in
Keynes' system; this simplification does not affect the argument that follows.
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tions by $i billion, and set off a contraction in theoutput of
consumer goods. In general, if income payments fell below $20
billion, the sales expectations of business firms would be exceeded;
while if income payments rose above $20 billion, the expectations
of business firms would be disappointed. 'In eithercase, forces
would be released that would push the system in the direction of
the $20 billion mark. Hence, in the given circumstances, $20 bil-
lion is the equilibrium income, and itmay be concluded that the
basic data—that is, the volume of investment and theconsump-
tion function—determine a national income of unique size.If
we assume, now, a unique correlation between income and em-
ployment, it follows that the basic data determine alsoa unique
volume of employment—which may turn outto be well below
'full' employment.
This is the theoretical skeleton that underlies the Keynesian
system. The theory implies that when unemployment exists,an
increase in consumer spending out ofa given income will expand
employment; so too will an increase in private home investment
or in exports, and so again will governmental loan expenditure,
its effect on employment being ina sense similar to that of private
investment expenditure. The theory implies also that themagni-
tude of the expansion in employment byany of these routes is a
precisely calculable quantity, since the determinants of employ-
ment are alleged to have been isolated. To get more out of the
theory, more specific assumptionsmust be made.
At this vital juncture the Keynesians differ somewhatamong
themselves, but two institutional assumptions dominatethe think-
ing of the school. The first is thatconsumer outlay is linked fairly
rigidly to national income and is unlikelyto expand unless in-
come expands; in other words, there is little reason toexpect, at
least in the short run, that a condition of unemploymentwill be
corrected through a reduction in individual savings. Thesecond
assumption is that investment opportunitiesare limited in a 'ma-
ture' economy such as our own; consequently, privateinvestment
may continue, year in and year out, at a level that falls consid-
erably short of what the community wouldsave if 'full employ-
ment' existed. If neither an upward shift inthe consumption
function, nor an expansion of private investmentat home, nor an
increase in net exports can be confidentlycounted on, it follows
that our lot may be persistentmass unemployment. We may escape
the fate of secular stagnation, however, if theeffective demand for
employment is supplemented by governmental spending.Further-
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more, this remedy for secular stagnation isalso the remedy for
business cycles, since the most that can be expected of private in-
vestment is that it may rise sufficiently to generate'full employ-
ment' during a fleeting boom.
Of late this theory has been refined and elaborated, so that
'deficit financing' need no longer be the key instrument for coping
with unemployment, and I shall refer to one of these refinements
at a later point. But the practical significance of themodifications
of the theory is problematical, and in any event the theory as I
have sketched it still dominates the thinking of the Keynesians
when they look beyond the transition from war to peace. The
similarity of this theory to the Ricardian model is unmistakable.
The most important proposition in Ricardian economics is that
the production function in agriculture has a certain shape, that
is, the marginal product diminishes as the input of labor increases.
The most important proposition in Keynesian economics is that
the consumption function has a certain shape, that is, consumer
outlay increases with national income but by less than the incre-
ment of income. The Ricardians treated the production function
as fixed, and deduced the effects on income distributionof an in-
crease or decrease in population, or of a tax or bounty on the pro-
duction of corn. The Keynesians treat the consumption function
as fixed, and deduce the effects on the size of the nationalincome
of an increase or decrease in private investment, or of an increase
or decrease in governmental loan expenditure. The Ricardians
believed that population was the key dynamic variable, and they
drew a gloomy picture of the course of events if that exuberant
variable was not counteracted. The Keynesians believe that in-
vestment is the key dynamic variable, and they draw a gloomy
picture of the course of events if that timid variable is not forti-
fied by governmental loan expenditure. To be sure, the Ricardians
recognized that the production function in agriculture was subject
to change, and they frequently inserted qualifications to their
main conclusions. The Keynesians likewise recognize that the con-
sumption function is not absolutely rigid, and they frequently in-
sert qualifications to their main conclusions. But I have formed
the definite impression that the Keynesians—except when they
discuss changes in personal taxation—attach even less importance
to their qualifications than did the Ricardians; all of which may
merely reflect the fact that the Ricardians were concerned largely
with secular changes, while the Keynesians are mainly concerned,RESEARCFL AND KEYNESIAN THINKING
despite their anxiety over secular stagnation, with comparatively
short-run changes.
There is, of course, nothing unscientific about Ricardianismas
such. But ceteris pan bus is a slippery tool, and may lead to serious
error if the premises accepted for purposes of reasoning are con-
trary to fact, or if the impounded data are correlated in experience
with factors that the theorist allows to vary, or if the veryprocess
of adjustment induces changes in the impounded data. Letus go
back to the theoretical skeleton of the Keynesian system andex-
amine it more carefully. Suppose that the volume of intended in-
vestment is $2 billion, income payments $20 billion, and con-
sumers' outlay at this level of income $i8 billion. On the basis of
these data, the economic system is alleged to be in equilibrium.
But the equilibrium is aggregative, and this is a mere arithmetic
fiction. Business firms do not have a common pocketbook. True,
they receive in the aggregate precisely thesum they had expected,
but that need not mean that even a single firm receives precisely
what it had expected. Since windfall profits and lossesare virtually
bound to be dispersed through the system, each firm will adjust
to its own sales experience, and within a firm the adjustment will
vary from one product to another. Under the circumstances the in-
tended investment cannot—quite apart from 'autonomous' changes
—very well remain at $2 billion, and the propensity to consume is
also likely to change. Our data therefore do not determinea unique
size of national income; what they rather determine isa movement
away from a unique figure. Of course, we cannot tell the direction
or magnitude of the movement, but that is because the basic data
on which the Keynesian analysis rests are not sufficiently detailed
for the purpose.
I have imagined that Keynes' aggregative equilibrium is realized
from the start. But suppose that this doesnot happen; suppose
that, in the initial period, the intended investment is$2 billion,
income payments $i6 billion, and that savingsat this level of in-
come are zero. Will income now gravitate towards the $20 billion
mark, as the theory claims it should? There is littlereason to ex-
pect this will happen. In the first place, windfall profits will be
unevenly distributed, and the adjustment of individual firmsto
their widely varying sales experiences will inducea change in the
aggregate of their intended investment. In the second place,un-
employed resources will exercisesome pressure on the prices of
the factors of production, and here and there tendto stimulate in-
vestment. In the third place, if an expansion in the output ofcon-
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sumer goods does get under way,it will induce additions to in-
ventories for purely technical reasons; further, the change in the
business outlook is apt to stimulate the formation of new firms,
and to induce existing firms to embark on investment undertak-
ings of a type that have no close relation t recent sales experience.
In the fourth place, as income expands, its distribution is prac-
tically certain to be modified; this will affect the propensity to
consume, as will also the emergenceof capital gains, the willing-
ness of consumers to increase purchases oncredit, and the diffi-
culty faced by consumers in adjusting many of their expenditures
to increasing incomes in the short run. Thesereactions, and I have
listed only the more obvious ones, are essential parts of the adjust-
ment mechanism of a free enterprise economy.Under their impact
the data with which we started—namely, the amount of intended
investment and the consumption function—are bound to change,
perhaps slightly, perhaps enormously. It is wrong, therefore, to
conclude that these data imply or determine, even in the sense of
a rough approximation, a unique level atwhich the income and
employment of a nation will tend to settle. In strict logic, the data
determine, if anything, some complex cumulative movement, not
a movement towards some fixed position.
If this analysis is sound, the imposing schemes for governmental
action that are being bottomed on Keynes' equilibrium theory
must be viewed with skepticism. It does not follow, of course,
that these schemes could not be convincingly defended on other
grounds. But it does follow that the Keynesians lack a clear ana-
lytic foundation for judging how a given fiscal policy will affect
the size of the national income or the volume of employment.
Fiscal policy is now the fashion among economists, and three fiscal
paths to 'full employment' have recently been delineated. The
first is to increase expenditure but not taxes. The second is to in-
crease taxes as much as expenditure. The third is to reduce taxes
but leave expenditure unchanged. The first of these methods—
that is,loan expenditure—avoids, we are told, the excessively
large expenditures of the second method, and the excessive deficits
of the third. This is a highly suggestive conclusion, and may have
much to recommend it on practical grounds. But to accept it as an
approximation to scientific truth we must be willing to make as-
sumptions of the following type:(i) the consumption function is
so shaped that the dollar volume of savings increases as incomein-
creases,(2) the consumption function is practically invariant ex-
cept in response to personal taxation, ()anincrease in taxes will
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lower the consumption function considerably but by less than the
addition to taxes, ()areduction in taxes will raise the consump-
tion function but by considerably less than the tax reduction,
()theplanned savings of business enterprises are correlated
simply and uniquely with income payments,(6) monopolistic
practices of business firms can safely be neglected, (7) private in-
vestment will not be influenced appreciably by the character of
the fiscal policy pursued by government. Although assumptions
such as these may be extremely helpful at a stage in our thinking
about an exceedingly complicated problem, it seems plain that
the inferences to which they lead cannot be regarded as a scientific
guide to governmental policies.
III.ISSUES OF FACT RAISED BY THE KEYNESIAN DOCTRINE
During the last decade the world has moved swiftly ina Keynesian
direction. Keynes' General Theory crystallized the despondency
of the thirties and gave it brilliant intellectual expression. Then
came the war, and with it unprecedented government expendi-
tures. The public debt followed suit; but the curse of unemploy-
ment was lifted. This experience has convinced many that demo-
cratic governments can, if they only have the will, readily subdue
business depressions. While the war was still raging, the British
government made the epoch-making announcement that it deemed
the maintenance of a stable and high level of employmenta
fundamental responsibility, which it would seek to discharge by
varying its own rate of spending and by such other devicesas may
keep total national expenditure steady. Similar policies have been
proclaimed in Canada and Australia. In our own country this
policy is being actively debated. The immediate outcome of the
controversy is uncertain; but it is reasonable to expect that the
gap between our thinking and the British will narrow quickly
when extensive unemployment again develops, and thatat least
in the near-term future we shall seek a solution within the frame-
work of an individualistic capitalism. For bothreasons the need
for authentic knowledge of the causes of unemployment in modern
commercial nations is now greater than ever.
The problem of unemployment facing our generation calls for
realistic, thorough, and unceasing investigation. Thegreat and
obvious virtue of the remedies proposed by the Keynesians is that
they seek to relieve mass unemployment; their weakness is that
they lean heavily on a speculative analysis of uncertain value.This
4[Thiswaswrittenbefore the passage of the Employment Act of 1946.]
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weakness attaches also to my critical remarks on the theory of under-
employmcnt equilibrium. Granted that the simple determinism of
Keynesian doctrine is an illusion, it does not follow that secular
stagnation is another, or that the consumption function may not
be sufficiently stable in experience to enable public officials to
forecast reliably some consequences of their policies. These ques-
tions raise factual issues of the highest importance, which should
be faced objectively: they are closely related to investigations that
we have carried out in the past and to investigations that we now
have under way.
In 1938, under a liberal grant from the Falk Foundation, we
undertook a detailed historical study of production and employ-
ment in the United States. This investigation has pushed statistical
measures of output back to 1870 or i88o for some major industries,
back to about 1900 for others. Whatever the time range covered,
the leading industries of the country show notable advances, decade
after decade, until we reach the thirties. There is nothing in this
statistical record to suggest 'secular stagnation' before that fateful
decade. The story appears dramatically in the statistics of manu-
facturing production. Output rose 58 per cent from 1899 to 1909,
41 per cent from 1909 to 1919, 64 per cent from 1919 to 1929. In
the next decade these remarkable advances came to an abrupt stop;
output increased a mere 3 per cent, whereas population rose 7.5
per cent.5 Estimates of the flow of goods, which Kuznets and Shaw
have traced back to about i 870, repeat Fabricant's story for manu-
facturing: substantial growth decade after decade, then virtual
standstill in the thirties. Data on employment and unemployment
are less reliable and do not go back as far as data on output. But
they too give no hint of stagnation until the thirties, when every-
thing seemed to change: unemployment, which amounted to 1.5
million in 1929, reached nearly 9 million in 1939.
All this, of course is generally known, as is also the chasm in
economic activity between 1929 and 1937 and the valley between
1937 and 1939. The significant question raised by the thirties is
not what happened to aggregate activity, but why economic prog-
ress suffered its severest setback of recent times. This question has
evoked lively debates in which many economists have participated.
One group, largely of the Keynesian persuasion, holds the view
that profound changes have been occurring for some time in the
dynamic factors of our economic life, but that their full impact
was delayed by the outbreak of World War I and other special
5 For the sources of the figures cited in this section, see Appendix One.
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circumstances until the 1930's. This group stresses the declining
rate of population growth, the disappearance of the frontier, and
the capital-saving character of many modern technological inno-
vations—all of which, it is argued, is tending to check investment
outlets severely. Another group traces the stagnation of the thirties
to ill-judged policies of government, particularly with respect to
labor, industrial combinations, public utilities, and the public
debt. A third group rationalizes the thirties in terms of a peculiar
conjuncture of short and long cycles, or in terms of a haphazard
succession of business cycles. Each group has defended its position
with persuasive logic and reassuring statistics, but no one has as
yet presented an interpretation of the thirties that weighs carefully
and dispassionately the many conflicting pieces of evidence.
That is by no means an easy task, as an examination of Table i
will quickly demonstrate. Stagnation—once we have learned how
to use this term_may perhaps describe adequately the aggregate
output and employment of the thirties, but it describes little else.
The period was anything but stagnant, even if the violent cyclical
movements are put out of sight, as they are roughly in Table i.
It was a period of turbulence, of swift and momentous change
in nearly every department of economic life. Let us stand back in
1929 and look ten years forward in our table. What do we see? A
growth in population but a drop in the rate of growth; some de-
cline in the number of active corporations and a severe slump in
the formation of new ones; consumer outlay in constant prices up
i i per cent, gross capital formation down 27 per cent; consumer
outlay on perishable goods up 29 per cent, on durable goods down
20 per cent; public construction unchanged, residential construc-
tion down 24 per cent, business construction down 67 per cent;
the flow of income payments reduced but the inequality of per-
sonal incomes apparently lessened; technological progress making
rapid strides over a wide range of industries; the cost of living
down i g per cent, the average hourly earnings of factory workers
up i 2 per cent, their hours worked per week down i 8 per cent,
and the number of them employed down 6 per cent; a still greater
improvement in the real hourly earnings of coal miners but not
in their employment; a sharp deterioration of farm wages; a vast
growth of trade unionism and industrial strife; wholesale com-
modity prices in general down 19 per cent, but prices of 'finished'
products down only 15 per cent, of building materials 5 per cent,
and of business capital goods i per cent; corporate profits much
reduced and new security issues down to a trickle; the stock mar-
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(continued on page 14)
Conspectus of Economic Changes, United States,1923-1939
(All figures are expressed as relatives on a 1929 base. Sources aregiven in Appendix
One.) —










































40.Dividends, interest, and rent
Relative share going to highest
41. 1% of income recipients
42. 5% of income recipients















53. Trade union membership














































































































14RESEARCH AND KEYNESIAN THINKING
TABLE 1(concluded)
Series 1939 number Series 1923 1929
INTEREST RATES
74.Commercial paper rate 86 100 16
Customers' rate
41 39c
75.New York City 88 100
100 68 67C 76.Southern and western cities 97
669 685C
77.Spread: (No. 76)—(No.75) 288 100
Corporate bond yields
100 69 64 78.Moody's Aaa bonds 108
85 84 79.Moody's Baa bonds 123 100
151 167 80.Spread: (No. 79)—(No. 78) 181
SUPPLY AND TURNOVER OF MONEY











45 83. Turnover of deposits 70
Bank debits 46 84.Total 54 100
33 28 85.New York City 39 100
74 69 86.Outside New York City 72 100
FOREIGN TRADE





89.Receiptsb 97 100 141
242
120
277 90.Expendituresb 97 100
211 238 91.Total debt 132 100
a Adjusted for changes in prices.
b Relatives for 1923 are not strictly comparable with those for 1937 and 1939.See Appendix.
c Computed from data for 1938. See Appendix, notes 75-76.
ket in a bad slump, particularly the prices of railroadand public
utility stocks; interest rates on the highest grade loanssharply
down but the spread among different types of interest rates very
much widened; bank deposits up 6 per cent but their rateof turn-
over much reduced; currency inthe hands of individuals and
firms up 68 per cent; foreign trade a shadow of its formerself; the
federal income tax pressing much harder, especially on the upper
brackets, yet the federal debt sharply up; the output ofagriculture
up i 1 per cent, of coal down 27 per cent,of manufacturing up 3
per cent, of railroads down 25 per cent,of electric light and power
up 52 per cent.
This bare recital might be elaborated to advantage, and a con-
trast drawn between the 'new era' ofthe twenties and the 'stag-
nation' of the thirties—both being represented in our table.But
the recital suffices for my present purpose, which ismerely to
show that for a period as complicated and turbulent asthe thirties
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it is not difficult to find particular facts that agreeablysupport any
one of several simple hypotheses. To some extent that is alwaysa
danger in historical interpretation, and the only real safeguard
against it is thorough scholarship. Forsome time we have planned
a volume that would sum up and interpret the massive informa-
tion developed in our studies of production, employment,and
productivity. The most important problem to be faced in that
final volume is the setback to economicprogress in the thirties:
whether that decade defines a new trend of stagnationor a passing
historical episode. To serve thispurpose it will be necessary to
cover the secular changes in the output and employment of Amer-
ican industry at least since the Civil War. Also, thedepression of
the thirties should be compared with thesevere depressions that
followed the crises of 1837,1873, and1893,andsome analysis of
foreign experience made. The investigation willstart from our
findings on employment and production, andas it proceeds draw
heavily on results reached in our historical studies of nationalin-
come, agriculture, transportation, construction, mechanization,
trade unionism, migration, wages, prices, interestrates, security
markets, and banking. Doubtless,a great deal of new and difficult
research will still be necessary, especially in connection withfor-
eign countries and the period before1900 in this country. But an
objective interpretation of the thirties is of vital significance;and
if our resources prove adequate,we should not be deterred by
the prospect that the capstone ofour studies in production and
employment may develop intoa series of monographs instead of
a single volume.
A study that comes to grips with the doctrine of secularstagna-
tion must deal not only with the hypothesis of decliningor inade-
quate investment opportunity, but also with the second main
pillar of the Keynesian edifice—namely, the assumptionthat the
consumption function is highly stable. This assumptionraises im-
portant questions of economic fact, quite apart from its bearing
on the stagnation thesis. A tentative exploration of the existing
statistics indicates that theconsumer outlay corresponding to a
national income of a given size varies appreciably withthe month
of the year, the stage of the business cycle, and with timegenerally;
in other words, that the consumption function issubject to sea-
sonal, cyclical, and secular shifts. Furthermore, randomshifts
seem so considerable in any one group of statistics, and to differ
so much from one group to another, that our ability to forecast
what increment of consumer outlay willaccompany a specified in-
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crement of income, to say nothing of aspecified increment of gov-
ernmental loan expenditure, is as yet very limited. These results
should be tested, converted into quantitative statementsif pos-
sible, and pushed in a constructive direction; in other words, a
statistical test of the Keynesian assumption concerning the rela-
tive stability of the consumption function should become an inci-
dent in a positive analysis of the influences that play on consumer
spending over time. Numerous studies already made by the Na-
tional Bureau or now in process will contribute materially tothis
undertaking—especially the investigation by Ruth Mack of the
shoe market and other aspects of the purchasing and prices of con-
sumer goods, the studies on national incomeand consumer outlay
by Kuznets, Shaw, and Barger, on consumer debt by the Financial
Research Program, on capital gains and losses by Seltzer, and on
the inequality of personal incomes by Friedman, Kuznets, and
Mendershausen.
The study of consumer spending links up with the study of sec-
ular stagnation when interest turns to the secular shifts in the
spending-savings pattern. Common observation and some existing
statistics suggest that, for the population as a whole, thrift has
been declining over the decades in the sense that the average sav-
ing at a given level of family income has been shrinking. If such
a trend has continued into the present,there is less reason to fear
secular stagnation than if the trend has been arrested. The data
necessary to develop adequately the secular aspectsof consump-
tion and saving will not be easy to find or to interpret when found,
but the importance of the question may justify our taking the risk.
IV. THE NEED FOR TESTED KNOWLEGE OF BusIss CYCLES
The investigations I have sketched deal with certain of the insti-
tutional assumptions of the Keynesian economists. If these investi-
gations prosper they should help materially to clarify public
thinking about the problem of maintaining a stable and high level
of employment in the years ahead. But these investigations cannot
be more than pieces in the solution of the great puzzle of business
cycles.
From its inception the National Bureau has recognized the need
of thorough study of economic fluctuations. A program of research
in business cycles was authorized by the Executive Committee in
1921, and has led to substantial publications ondifferent aspects
of the subject by King, Thorp, Jerome, Mitchell, Wolman, Ma-
caulay, Clark, Schmidt, Gayer, Mills, and Haberler. A volume on
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Measuring Business Cycles will be off thepress in a matter of
weeks, and other reports will follow shortly. Nota few of our
studies abound in subtle theoretical analysis, but theystress espe-
cially those observable phenomena of cyclical behavior whichin
common parlance pass as 'facts.' This feature of our work reflects
a cool scientific judgment: viz., if business cycles are to beex-
plained reliably, we should have precise and tested knowledgeof
what the business cycles of actual life have been like. Unlesssuch
knowledge is attained, any explanation is boundto bear an un-
certain relation to the experienceswe seek to understand or to
guard against.
The consequences that may flow froma disregard of this ele-
mentary precaution are exemplified in Keynes' sketch of business
cycles at the end of his long treatiseon underemployment equilib-
rium. Keynes starts by saying thata theory of business cycles should
account for a certain regularity in the duration andsequence of
cyclical phases—that the duration of contractions, forexample, is
about three to five years. Second, the theory shouldaccount for
the sharp and sudden transition from expansionto contraction, in
contrast to the gradual and hesitant shift from contractionto ex-
pansion. These starting points fora theoretical inquiry suggest
preoccupation with a single dramatic case—the collapsefrom
1929 to 1933. In the United States at least, business cycle contrac-
tions have not run typically from threeto five years; the typical
duration is much shorter. Nor is thereany such systematic differ-
ence between the upper and lower turning pointsas Keynes sup-
poses. The upturn of 1933 in this country conforms to his rule,
the upturns of 1924 and 1938donot, nor do the downturns of
1926 and 1937—to mention onlya few recent cases. Since Keynes
works with an artificially simplified business cycle, it isnot sur-
prising that his explanation collides with thefacts of experience.
His theory is that a collapse of investment bringsprosperity to a
close; that this in turn is caused bya collapse of confidence regard-
ing the profitability of durableassets; and that the contraction
which follows is bound to last,say, three to five years, since recov-
ery is possible only after stocks have been worked off and,more
important still, after the 'fixed' capital of business firmshas been
reduced sufficiently to restore its profitability. Butcan this theory
be easily reconciled with the fact that orders formachinery, orders
for other durable equipment, andcontracts for different categories
of construction often reach cyclical maximaat widely scattered
dates? Or with the fact thateven a sharp decline in investment
18RESEARCH AND KEYNESIAN THINKING
orders is ordinarily converted into a fairly gradual decline in in-
vestment expenditure, which moreover starts severalmonths later?
Or with the fact that the stock of durable goods in a growing
country is virtually free from any trace of L usinesscycles, increas-
ing as a rule during contractions of business activity as well as
during expansions?
Keynes' adventure in business cycle theory is by no means ex-
ceptional. My reason for singling it out is merely that the General
Theory has become for many, contrary to Keynes' own wishes, a
sourcebook of established knowledge. Fanciful ideas about business
cycles are widely entertained both by men of affairs and by aca-
demic economists. That is inevitable as long as the problem is at-
tacked on a speculative level, or if statistics serve merely as a casual
check on speculation. To develop a reliable picture of the business
cycles of actual life it is necessary to study with fine discrimination
the historical records of numerous economic activities—not merely
investment, or employment, or public finances, or banking opera-
tions, but all these and many others. Statistical data, preferably by
months or quarters, must be marshaled with care; wherever pos-
sible these records must be pushed back well into the nineteenth
century, checks on each series must be devised, contradictions
among series sifted, new data developed and old data recombined
as needed, the relation of each series to the process it purports to
represent investigated, and a scientific method for measuring the
cyclical features of time series developed. Work on this plan is
costly and time-consuming; it means much turning back, revising,
rethinking, redoing; it often leads to disappointments and taxes
patience. But there is no reliable short cut to tested knowledge.
Public thinking about business cycles can be confused by hurried
and ill-digested statistical inquiries, no less than by speculative
excursions from the dreamland of equilibrium or from the caprices
of common sense.
It is tempting for statistical investigators, as it is for speculative
writers, to analyze business cycles on the basis of comprehensive
aggregates. But although broad index numbers or aggregates give
useful summaries, they tell nothing of the processes by which they
are fashioned. The conception of a business cycle as a synchronous
expansion of all economic activities followed by a synchronous
contraction, which theorists so often hold, is not drawn from life.
Expansions and contractions occur together, side by side, at every
stage of the business cycle. If that fact sometimes escapes our
notice, it is only because we are in the habit of watching aggre-
19RESEARCH AND KEYNESIAN THINKING
gates. Pulsating movements go on steadily within the aggregates,
and they often have no close relation to the cyclical tide of the
aggregates. A community, an industry, an individual firm experi-
ences a rise here and a fall there; each faces some pressure or op-
portunity of its own—finding an outlet for its wares, adjusting to
a competitor's improved technology, financing an expansion of
output, replacing an exhausted source of raw materials, starting
a new business, converting to a new kind of production, adjusting
to new governmental regulations, and so on. These divergencies
in economic fortune are no less important for the understanding
of business cycles than is the dominance of expansion during some
periods and of contraction during others.
The character of the employment problem is not brought out
adequately by existing statistics, and it will not be until statistical
agencies publish three figures instead of one for each industry
and all industries combined; that is, the number of employees in
'firms' experiencing a rise in employment, the number in 'firms'
experiencing a decline in employment, as well as the total number
employed. A rough equivalent of this type of information, how-
ever, is the breakdown of some aggregate figure, such as factory
employment, into industrial components. Our Business Cycle
Unit has analyzed the behavior of many of the published sub-
divisions as well as of the broad composites. Table2 shows the
distribution of changes in direction of twenty-one independent
series on factory employment, from stage to stage of the four busi-
ness cycles in this country from 1921 to 1938. We find that expan-
sions are imperfectly diffused during a cyclical upswing inaggre-
gate activity, and that contractions are imperfectly diffused during
a cyclical downswing. But the diffusion is much greater during a
vigorous cyclical movement such as that from1929 to 1933 than
during a mild cyclical movement such as that from 1926to 1927.
There is also some tendency for the diffusion to be greater during
the middle stages of a cyclical upswing or downswing inaggregate
activity than during the transitional stages fromone phase to the
other. If our table covered 210 series instead of21 it would doubt-
less show smaller diffusion throughout. That would also betrue
if we examined shorter periods than our stage-to-stage intervals,
which is a matter of some importance ina long cyclical phase such
as that of 1929-1933. On the other hand, it seems likely that if the
table showed the actual volume of employment gained by indus-
tries experiencing a rise and the actual volume lost by industries
experiencing a decline, the diffusion wouldappear greater than it
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Directions of Change from Stage to Stage of Business Cycles
Index of Factory Employment and Twenty-one of Its Components






Cycle and interval employment Rise Fall change
Cycle of Sept. 1921 to July 1924
Stage I to stage II + 11 9 1
Stage II to stage III + 13 8
Stage III to stage IV + 18 2
Stage IV to stage V + 16 4 1
Stage V to stage VI — ii 10
Stage VI to stage VII — 2 18
Stage VII to stage VIII — 2 18
Stage VIII to stage IX — 2 19
Cycle of July 1924 to Dec. 1927
Stage I to stage II + 15 6
Stage II to stage III + 16 5
Stage III to stage IV + 13 8
Stage IV to stage V + 11 10
Stage V to stage VI — 9 12
Stage VI to stage VII — 12 9
Stage VII to stage VIII — 9 12
Stage VIII to stage IX — 5 16
Cycle of Dec. 1927 to March 1932
Stage I to stage II + 8 12 1
Stage II to stage III + 11 10
Stage III to stage IV + 17 4
Stage IV to stage V + 15 6
Stage V to stage VI — 2 19
Stage VI to stage VII — . .. 21
Stage VII to stage VIII — ... 21
Stage VIII to stage IX — 5 16
Cycle of March 1923 to May 1928
Stage I to stage II + 21
Stage II to stage III + 19 2
Stage III to stage IV + 18 2
Stage IV to stage V + 20 1
Stage V to stage VI — 6 15
Stage VI to stage VII — ... 21
Stage VII to stage VIII — 2 19
Stage VIII to stage IX — 6 15
Average of 4 cycles, 1921-1928
Stage I to stage + 13.8 6.8 0.5
Stage II to stage III + 14.8 6.2
Stage III to stage IV + 16.5 4.5
Stage IV to stage V + 15.5 5.2 0.2
Stage V to stage VI — 7.0 14.0
Stage VI to stage VII — 2.8 17.2
Stage VII to stage VIII — 2.5 17.5
Stage VIII to stage IX — 4.5 16.5
Stage I represents the intttal trough of a bustness cycle, stages TI-fl)'successivethtrds of expansion,
stage V the peak, stages VI-VIII successive thirds of contraction, and stage IX the terminal trough.
For explanattons of the chronology of business cycles and their division into stages, see A. F.
Burns snd w. C. Mitchell, Measuring Business Cycles (National Bureau, 1946), Chap. 4,Sees.
mI-v; Chap. 5,Sec. vu; and Appendix A. The employment series are indexes by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, adjusted for seasonsi variations. The twenty-one components are the maximum
number of subdivisions available in our business cycle collection. They include flour, baking, cane
sugar refining, slaughtering and meat packing, tobacco manufactures, cotton goods, silk and rayon
goods, dyeing and finishing textiles, men's clothing, shirts and collars, women's clothing, millinery,
leather, boots and shoes, paper and printing, iron and steel products, furniture, glass, transporta-
tion equipment, machinery, building materials. These series represent 67 per cent of total factory
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does in the present table. But even as the figures stand, they bring
out a vital feature of business cycles. They suggest that the mere
maintenance of aggregate expenditure by governmental action
may give slight aid to the declining sectors of the economy just
after a peak in aggregate activity has been passed; further, since
no two contractions are strictly alike, a governmental policy aim-
ing at 'full employment' will need to rely on measures that are
adjusted from case to case.
The breakdown of aggregates not only helps to define the nature
of the business cycle problem; it often also gives a clue to the
processes that link different business factors together. Suppose,
for example, that 'investment' goes up. This may be a sign that
business will soon improve materially, as when extensive new con-
struction gets under way; or it may be a sign that business will
soon get worse, as when goods pile up beyond dealers' intentions.
The ambiguity can be cleared up a little by examining investment
in inventories apart from investment in structures and equipment.
But the cyclical behavior of inventories, or of net changes in in-
ventories, is itself a resultant of highly diverse patterns. For ex-
ample, the stocks held by manufacturers tend to lag about nine
months on the average at the cyclical turns in production; this lag
covers up the tendency of goods in process to move synchronously
with production, of raw material stocks to lag about two months
at cyclical turns, and of stocks of finished manufactured staples to
lag more than a year. These findings set a problem. Why, for
example, is the adjustment of stocks of finished staples retardedso
long? This question naturally impels an investigator to examine
the behavior of production, shipments, and prices.
Again, broad composites on construction contracts and building
permits show that commitments for new structures asa rule begin
to decline while industrial production, employment, and national
income are still expanding; further, commitments fornew struc-
tures as a rule turn upward months before general business ac-
tivity revives. It is tempting to suggest an explanation of the cyclical
lead in terms of broad market forces. But suchan explanation
cannot be entertained seriously unless the cyclical leads that appear
in the aggregates of construction workare repeated in minor sub-
divisions. To this question the statistics give,on the whole, an
affirmative answer, but the breakdown also discloses systematic
discrepancies in the movements of different parts of construction.
For example, public and institutional projects tendto move ir-
regularly in relation to business cycles while private projectscon-
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form closely; residential projects tend to lead industrial projects
both at recoveries and recessions; contracts for new factories in in-
dustries organized into many small units seem to lead contracts of
industries characterized by relatively few but large units; new rail-
road projects led cyclical recoveries in the 1870's and i88o's by a
substantial interval, but the lead shrank with the passage of time
and has now disappeared. These and similar findings incite a re-
alistic investigator to examine the changing pace of new invest-
ment undertakings in relation to the circumstances peculiar to
different classes of investors, as well as in relation to factors—such
as the movement of national income, construction costs, interest
rates, and the policies of lenders—which may be expected to in-
fluence investors generally. Further, just as the investigator must
work backward from contracts to the factors that shape investment
decisions, so he must work forward and analyze the timing of con-
struction expenditures and of completed projects. As long as pro-
duction periods are short, as is true of the great bulk of manu-
factured commodities, it is sufficient ordinarily to speak of the
production of an industry during a certain month or year without
specifying whether 'production' refers to the volume started, or the
volume executed, or the volume completed. These distinctions
can be neglected in the case of the construction industry only at
the risk of confusion and error. For example, contracts for factory
construction typically reach a peak about two months before gen-
eral business activity turns down, but it appears that the crop of
newly completed factories reaches its maximum when contraction
is well under way—or just in time to intensify the competitive
struggle then in process.
I have stressed the importance of breaking down aggregates be-
cause this matter, so slighted by the Keynesian economists, is a cen-
tral feature of our own work on business cycles. It explains better
than anything else why our investigations extend over years. Hap-
pily, we have reached a point where a substantial part of our re-
sults will soon be made available to the public. Several of our
monographs on special topics are close to the stage of publication.
Most important of all, we expect to publish this year Wesley
Mitchell's progress report on What Happens during Business
Cycles. This volume will be the first instalment of a grand syn-
thesis of our cyclical measurements, which even in their present
unfinished state cover a very wide range of economic activities.
Mitchell's progress report will render obsolete his California trea-
tise, which—although published thirty-three years ago—has re-
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mained to this day the best theoretical account of how the economic
organization of the Western world generates business cycles.
We hope that our quest of the lessons of experience will aid
other students, as well as laymen who must wrestle practically with
business cycles. Whether a cyclical d&wnturn can be recognized
promptly enough to permit immediate governmental intervention,
whether cost-price relations are of slight consequence in the termi-
nation of a boom, whether inflationary tendencies become impor-
tant only as 'full employment' is approached, whether the volume
of the circulating medium rises and falls in close sympathy with
aggregate activity, whether minor cycles mainly reflect inventory
fluctuations, whether the volume of investment is materially af-
fected over periods of business cycle length by the rate of change
in consumer spending_these and similar matters are, after all, not
metaphysical questions. True, the most painstaking studies of ex-
perience will not always lead to conclusive answers; but they
should at least narrow the margins of uncertainty, and thus furnish
a better basis than now exists for dealing with grave issues of
business cycle theory and policy.
V.THE RANGE AND CONTINUITY OF THE BUREAU'S
RESEARCH PROGRAM
If I am right in believing that the Keynesian thinking of our
times makes realistic investigation of business cycles more neces-
sary than ever, we should seek to intensify our work on that sub-
ject. The obvious method of promoting this objective is to expand
the Business Cycle Unit well beyond its present size, but such a
policy would be shortsighted. The 'material' of speculative in-
vestigations of business cycles consists largely of concepts and
mOdels, which often have no obvious use in any other branch of
economics. Realistic investigations, on the other hand, draw their
material from records of experience. In such inquiries the subject
of business cycles can never be put in a box by itself. Any record
that makes a contribution to knowledge of how our economicor-
ganization works becomes automatically a datum in business cycle
analysis. That is clearly true of records that come in the shape of
time series, and is no less true of cross-section studies which indi-
cate the order of magnitude of economic quantities.
The main reason why we are able to conduct the far-reaching
studies of business fluctuations that I have sketched in this report
is that throughout our history we have done basic statisticalre-
search on national income, production, employment, prices, wages,
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and finance. These inquiries have developed factual information
of the highest importance, have stimulated work by other students,
and led to improvements in the work of official agencies. Their
work in turn has stimulated ours, and this process must continue.
The study of national income is our oldest enterprise, and one
that has proved especially useful to economists, businessmen, and
public officials. Nevertheless, vital differences of concept and fact
still divide estimators of national income. Employment estimates
have been much improved and extended in recent years, but it is
uncertain whether they can meet the strain that may soon be put
on them. Measures of the cost of living and price indexesof other
types still require careful attention, especially in comparisonsof
distant periods and different countries. We are therefore not only
continuing, but expanding, our work in these directions. Mean-
while we are engaged in new statistical explorations of the flow
of money payments, urban real estate finance, and agricultural
finance. We expect that beside making a direct contribution to
knowledge, these explorations will lead to substantial improve-
ments in current statistics.
The usefulness of our various studies extends beyond their value
in business cycle analysis. Although the issue of 'full employment'
justly dominates economic thinking today, we must not allow our
concern with that problem to blind us to other matters ofgenuine
significance. Apart from the ravages of unemployment the stand-
ard of living is still appallingly low for the great masses of man-
kind, and different groups of society—within and across national
boundaries—have special and changing problems of their own. In
the years ahead we must continue to shape our research program
with an eye to these requirements for economic knowledge, as
well as the problem of business cycles. We must continue to focus
attention on the large issues concerning the 'production, exchange,
and distribution of wealth,' substitute as far as possible facts for
speculations, remain critical of our work, strive steadily to im-
prove it, and cooperate with others. If our zeal and industry remain
strong, we shall not fail to render a definite service to our own
generation and to the generations that will come after us.
I am grateful to several friends for reading and criticizing this report. My chief
debt is to Geoffrey H. Moore, who did the great bulk of the work on the tabular
matter presented. Mr. Moore was assisted by Virginia Buckner, Millard Hastay,
Hanna Stern, and other members of the National Bureau staff.
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